Developmental State

Este trabalho analisa o potencial das terras raras como instrumento de desenvolvimento econômico, industrial e tecnológico no Brasil. Partindo da literatura desenvolvimentista e da economia política internacional, a pesquisa discute como a atuação do Estado, por meio de políticas industriais, regulação econômica e planejamento estratégico, pode transformar recursos minerais em vantagens competitivas de longo prazo. O estudo examina a posição brasileira na cadeia global de terras raras, compara experiências internacionais de sucesso e argumenta que a agregação de valor, a transferência de tecnologia e o fortalecimento da indústria nacional são elementos fundamentais para evitar a reprodução de um modelo primário-exportador. Ao abordar a relação entre recursos naturais, soberania econômica e desenvolvimento, o trabalho contribui para o debate sobre estratégias nacionais de inserção produtiva em um contexto de transição tecnológica e energética global.

Is it possible to reconcile one of the institutional strategies to promote development, known in the literature as “the developmental state”, with contemporary democratic systems of government? If so, what are the challenges, trade-offs and potential gains that such an effort may entail? The vast literature on “the developmental state” claims that it is more likely to succeed under autocratic regimes. While a “democratic developmental state” seems possible in theory, there is very little empirical evidence to show how it would work in practice. This article tries to contribute to this debate by analyzing the case of Brazil, a country that transitioned from a military dictatorship to a democratic regime in the late 1980s, and has been moving towards increasing state interventionism since 2002. While the policies implemented by the “New Developmental State” in Brazil have been explored in the academic literature, their democratic dimensions remain unchartered. There has not been a det...

The view of a crisis of the nation-state in Africa has culminated into a number of emerging solutions most of which do not adequately address the relationship between political actors and the state. Central to the examination of African states is the wide usage of the concept of neo-patrimonial statea concept criticised for inadequately explaining African states. This paper seeks to reconceptualise the existence of African states as structures -that is the contexts within which political actors formulate socio-economic policies and pursue strategies for economic and social development; laying the basis for engagement in the international political economy. Giving an example of Mauritian trade policymaking, the paper argues that trade policy is a political output decided by human actors in the context of state structures that favour certain actors as they engage in a deliberative and consultative manner. The author also argues that this has created a 'deliberative democratic developmental state' that retains the sovereignty to provide contexts for trade making-policy that forms the basis for engagement in the international trade system.

Niemcy od ponad trzech dekad pozostają niekwestionowanym liderem polskiego handlu zagranicznego. Niniejszy artykuł analizuje dynamikę wymiany towarowej między Polską a Niemcami w latach 2007-2024, opierając się na danych Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego (GUS) oraz Krajowej Izby Gospodarczej (KIG). Szczególna uwaga poświęcona jest strukturze branżowej wymiany, rosnącej roli przemysłu motoryzacyjnego, zagrożeniom wynikającym z koncentracji eksportu oraz czynnikom strukturalnym odpowiedzialnym za obserwowane w latach 2023-2024 spadki wolumenów handlowych.

Abstract The purpose of this article is to examine the validity of Max Weber's theory of domination as applied to Latin America and its social and political structures.
The article concentrates on the advantages and risks involved when using the concept of patrimonialism to explain the authoritarian regimes of Latin American societies. To do this, the author examines how this concept has been applied for the study of the political organisation in different countries during various periods of time: the colonial era, the nineteenth century and contemporary societies.
Focused on terminological analysis, the paper shows the conceptual problems of classical sociological theory when used for the study of social realities that were not at all central preoccupations for the original European writers. The author points out two main causes for the ambiguities and multiple meanings of concepts 1) the partial and fragmented reception of Weberian sociology in Latin America and 2) certain confusion already present in Weber's studies.

This article analyses how the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) shaped the socioeconomic and political conditions of contemporary South Africa. It argues that CODESA was both a historic democratic achievement and an incomplete transformation settlement. The negotiations prevented a large-scale civil war and opened the road to the 1994 democratic election and supplied the constitutional grammar of a non-racial democratic state. Yet a close reading of CODESA declarations, working-group records and transition agreements also shows that the process prioritised political settlement, constitutional continuity, institutional stability and elite compromise more than immediate restructuring of land, wealth, spatial inequality and economic ownership. The article therefore rejects a simplistic claim that CODESA alone caused present crises, but it also rejects the equally weak view that CODESA was merely a neutral technical process. From a political analyst's perspective, the contemporary crises of unemployment, inequality, weak municipalities, corruption, crime, land hunger and citizen frustration must be located in three overlapping forces: apartheid's structural legacy, the compromises of the negotiated transition and the conduct of post-1994 leadership. The article traces this argument through the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, Kgalema Motlanthe, Jacob Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa, showing how each administration either stabilised, managed, deepened or failed to resolve the contradictions inherited from the transition.

As of early 2026, discussions on Ukraine’s prospective membership dominate international coverage of the European Union’s evolving borders. That is somewhat peculiar, given that the website of the European Commission lists1 as many as 10 countries as “candidates for membership.” With the exception of Türkiye— whose accession remains politically unlikely—the remaining candidates emerged from the disintegration of the former socialist bloc and exhibit substantially lower per capita incomes than any state previously admitted to the EU. The largest and poorest among them is war-torn Ukraine. This paper reviews the historical trajectory of the EU’s enlargements using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Drawing on conceptual tools from world systems analysis, it assesses the economic feasibility and political willingness of the EU to address the development challenges associated with further enlargement. The study also evaluates the likely forms of integration
that may emerge between the EU and its current candidate countries.

But over time, Indonesia and Thailand democratised rapidly while Singapore and Malaysia remained more or less semi-democratic. As Reilly (2006) has shown, the institutions of democracy in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand ( hereafter IMT), and in East Asia had taken a centripetal thrust, adopting a combination of majoritarian electoral systems (Reilly, 2006, 109-112), political party systems that favour institutionalisation of a small number of large bridging parties (Reilly, 2006, 131-142), and forms of executive government that increase government stability (Reilly, 2006: 146-166).

Este artigo propõe o Sistema JP (Sistema de Justiça Participativa) — um modelo híbrido de desenvolvimento para Angola, fundamentado em três pilares complementares: (1) a adopção de uma economia de mercado com controlo estatal estratégico, inspirada nas políticas de desenvolvimento da China; (2) a integração do sistema de governança comunitária Kgotla, originário do Botswana; e (3) a construção de uma democracia africanizada, adaptada à realidade política, cultural e social de Angola. Ancorando-se nos dados do Censo 2024 do INE Angola e nas reclamações estruturais da população — IVA mal implementado, subida dos combustíveis, propinas universitárias sem melhoria do ensino, défice de água e electricidade — o artigo propõe reformas concretas e mensuráveis, incluindo o Sistema MUTAL de transportes urbanos, a integração de Angola no programa Erasmus+ e um Fundo Nacional de Bolsas de Mérito. O artigo estima que, num horizonte de 10 anos, o Sistema JP pode reduzir o coeficiente de Gini de 0,59 para 0,45-0,50, aumentar o acesso à electricidade de 48,5% para 75-80% da população, e reduzir em 35-50% o custo de transporte urbano em Luanda.

Thirty years of neoliberal restructuring have side-lined alternative financing practices, and propagated mainstream myths about state-owned banks. This chapter examines these neoliberal claims, arguing instead that state-owned banks can remain a crucial part of progressive, sustainable and democratic strategies for investments in long-term development and infrastructure. Drawing on past and present case studies, as well as the theoretical literature on finance, the chapter points to the potential to revive -and improve -state-owned banking as a viable option for financing public services and development. To this end the chapter dispels nine popular neoliberal claims about state-owned banks while discussing how state-owned banks have undergone neoliberal restructuring processes such as marketization and corporatization in ways that nonetheless challenge their status as 'public' banks. To illustrate, the chapter looks at imperfect, but telling or inspiring, examples from Brazil,

This article undertakes a comparative historical and political analysis of the authoritarian rule of Idi Amin Dada of Uganda (1971-1979) and Sani Abacha of Nigeria (1993-1998), two of post-colonial Africa's most consequential military dictators. Drawing on neopatrimonial theory, predatory state literature, and the comparative authoritarianism framework, the article identifies a recurring template of power consolidation observable across both regimes: illegitimate seizure of state authority; the construction of overlapping security architectures designed to suppress opposition; strategic manipulation of ethnic and religious identities; systematic extraction of state resources for patronage distribution; and the deployment of foreign policy as a shield against international accountability. The analysis argues that while superficial differences in personality and governance style are real, they are largely epiphenomenal. Beneath them lies a structural sameness rooted in the absence of institutional constraints on executive authority. The article concludes that the durability and terminal collapse of both regimes illustrate the inherent contradictions of neopatrimonial governance: the very strategies that sustain authoritarian rule systematically destroy the economic and institutional foundations upon which any durable political order must rest.

C’est dans un contexte de crise profonde qu’Abiy Ahmed arrive au pouvoir en 2018 en tant que Premier ministre. Ses discours en faveur de la paix et de l’unité éthiopienne font alors naître beaucoup d’espoirs. À la veille des élections générales de 2026, le pays est en grande difficulté. Les violences à grande échelle se multiplient depuis 2019 (régions Oromo, Tigray, Amhara), plaçant ces élections dans un contexte inédit par rapport aux précédentes. La légitimité du Premier ministre paraît plus fragile, et la société civile, qui avait connu une ouverture sans précédent après l’arrivée au pouvoir d’Abiy Ahmed, subit des pressions croissantes de la part des agences de sécurité. Quant à l’opposition partisane, elle reste divisée sur l’attitude à adopter vis-à-vis du gouvernement : le rejoindre, boycotter ou s’opposer. Dans un tel contexte, il est important d’interroger le potentiel déstabilisateur de cette échéance électorale de 2026. Comment le régime prépare-t-il cette élection ? Comment se positionnent les oppositions ? Quel est le potentiel déstabilisateur de l’élection dans un contexte national et régional extrêmement tendu ? Ce sont les principales questions auxquelles cette étude apporte des éléments de réponse.

This article examines the divergence between Eritrea’s post-independence macroeconomic vision and its subsequent institutional trajectory. While the 1994 policy framework articulated an outward-oriented, export-led development model, the decades that followed have been marked by low growth, sectoral stagnation, and increasing reliance on extractive industries and remittances. Rather than treating this outcome as a failure of policy design or execution alone, the article proposes a structural reinterpretation: a transformation in the governing logic of the state in which development was progressively subordinated to security imperatives.

Introducing the concept of the “security-overhang state,” the analysis argues that economic institutions were not simply weakened but reconfigured around priorities of control, endurance, and threat management. To situate this transformation more broadly, the article advances a Basin Logic framework, which conceptualizes the Red Sea and Nile region as a historical zone of circulation whose developmental potential depends on openness and interdependence. Eritrea’s trajectory is thus understood as an inversion from circulation to insulation.

The article concludes that the central issue is not the ambition of the original vision, but its growing misalignment with the governing logic that emerged. This reframing offers a conceptual lens for understanding not only Eritrea’s experience, but broader patterns of development under prolonged security conditions.

ABSTRACT To what extent do public infrastructure projects respond to political pressures or developmental imperatives? Do these projects reflect a technical strategy aimed at upgrading economic productivity or the political distribution of public goods that rewards certain voters or political actors? This paper analyses the Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC), an $817 billion-dollar Brazilian infrastructure programme with a multi-method research design pairing in-country interviews and analysis of an original, municipal-level dataset. I conclude that my case study reflects a mixture of political and technical factors, which mirrors the competing influence of technocratic bureaucrats and politically-driven politicians during the project selection process. Despite explicitly targeting larger municipalities with infrastructure deficiencies, the programme still rewarded core-voting districts supporting the winning PT (Workers Party/Partido dos Trabalhadores) presidential candidates. A secondary result finds older municipalities with greater bureaucratic capacity were better positioned to successfully submit projects for federal funding.

Can institutions foster greater environmental awareness in a developmental state? Can a policymaking process driven by "autonomous" bureaucrats include civil society and does this affect policy outcomes? With these questions in mind, I explore the politics behind hydroelectric dam construction in environmentally and culturally sensitive locations in Brazil. Using mixed methods to compare two distinct developmental periods, I find developmental policy makers are becoming more sensitive to the environmental and social costs of large dams instead of solely prioritizing economic objectives. Constitutional protections, indigenous rights, a licensing process with mandated public audiences, and an active public prosecutor are compelling the democratic developmental state to better engage civil society and the environment. Ultimately, the Brazilian state is building a more inclusive developmental model and my research demonstrates how democratic political institutions and environmental protections changed the policy-making process and created a preference for less damaging but less efficient run-of-the-river dams.

The emergence of the BRICS+ has broadened the inherent benefits of strategic coalition and geopolitical groups in a changing world. BRICS+ catalyzes development and cooperation among developing countries, offering an alternative framework for economic, political, and social progress that developing countries can harness. This article examines the strategic consequences of Ethiopia's recent membership in the BRICS+ group, specifically emphasizing the possible economic and political advantages for the nation. The paper discusses the historical evolution, goals, and advantages of BRICS+ and situates Ethiopia's membership within the perspective of neoliberal internationalism. The paper used a desk review method and interviews, which were analyzed using a narrative analysis. The paper suggests that Ethiopia's involvement in BRICS+ has the potential to improve its economic outlook by attracting foreign direct investment, obtaining financial assistance from the New Development Bank, and strengthening commercial ties, especially with China and India. From a political standpoint, being a member of BRICS+ provides Ethiopia with enhanced diplomatic leverage, prospects for cooperation at both regional and global levels, and a more robust standing within the African Union. Nevertheless, the paper highlights notable obstacles, such as persistent political instability and macroeconomic imbalances, that may hinder Ethiopia's capacity to fully use its BRICS+ membership. To fully exploit the advantages, the paper recommends adopting a bilateral-multilateral strategy that involves strengthening bilateral partnerships, efficiently harnessing BRICS+ resources, and resolving internal problems to guarantee a steady and enduring expansion.

How is a policy initiated and implemented toward a newly arising industrial sector? This paper addresses that question by looking at the way the Japanese and the South Korean governments respond to the massive production and export of pop culture. The investigation focuses on the emergence of the local cultural industries, the policy issues they raise, and the domestic discourse they initiate. The central argument of this paper is that these governments no longer perceive the cultural industries in only ideological terms, but following the success of the private sector, they have recently shifted their attention to the economic benefits derived from the commodification of culture. However, their efforts to foster the pop culture sector heavily emphasize investment in infrastructure as a part of a developmental-state strategy. This attitude is too rigid to accommodate the dynamism of the cultural industries and should be supplemented with a more nuanced approach that considers the distinctive structure and the organization of the cultural industries.

This study examines the dynamics of economic policy coordination and implementation in Nigeria, with a focus on state-level development in Taraba State. It evaluates the roles of federal-state collaboration, innovative financing mechanisms, and social protection interventions including Social Register, Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) schemes, Taraba Cares and the National Home-Grown School Feeding Programme (NHGSFP). The research integrates lessons from the EU-Nigeria Development Cooperation Seminar (Abuja, September 2025) and the National Social Protection Policy Reviewed Workshop (Keffi, October 2025), highlighting best practices and challenges in harmonizing policy objectives. Findings suggest that effective coordination, robust institutional frameworks, and strategic intergovernmental collaboration are critical to achieving inclusive and sustainable statelevel development. Recommendations emphasize strengthening data systems, fiscal alignment, participatory planning, and multi-sectoral partnerships to enhance developmental outcomes in Taraba State and beyond.

The 1994 Rwandan Tsutsi genocide, which lasted 100 days, caused the death of approximately 1 million people and left its mark on the Rwandan nation but also had a global impact. The Rwandan Genocide, which occurred after the Cold War, is the result of the Belgian colonial legacy that had begun to divide Rwandan society since 1922. This inter-ethnic conflict resulted in the destruction of Rwanda on the social, economic, infrastructure, political and health levels. However, post-genocide Rwanda was built by a key element of society that had been sidelined for years: women. After the 1994 genocide, Rwandan women played and continue to play a vital role in rebuilding the nation both politically and economically, making Rwanda one of the countries in the world with a parliament with a number of women that exceeds that of men.

The capital market is a means for investors to invest in the long term and diversify, spread ownership of the company, and even create a healthy business climate through information disclosure. Political phenomena and events that occur in a country greatly affect the sensitivity of the capital market and can affect investors' decisions in investing in the capital market, because the political situation of a country affects the country's economic conditions. This study was determined of abnormal return and trading volume activity of South Korea’s political events. It has a ten windows period, amounts of samples were 98 companies of KRX 100 by purposive sampling technique. Analysis techniques used one-sample t-test and paired difference test. The result showed there is an abnormal return, a significant negative abnormal return difference, and no significant trading volume activity before and after South Korea’s political events. It means South Korea’s market is said to be effi...

Did Southern African states have the developmental focus to make their countries rich? My hypothesis is that a clear focus on making the country rich (with networked infrastructure, effective and functioning technology, functioning health and educational systems, high national income, diversified economy) would dictate that the priorities of the state be ordered in a certain way. My argument is that most Southern African states were historically not properly focused on making their countries rich. My other argument is that most of them are slowly shifting their focus towards making their countries rich.

The aim of this paper is to explore some of the major differences in the ways in which governments influence the process of skill formation. In particular, we focus on the ways in which governments use the market as a means of delivering the skills required for economic growth. We argue that the exclusive reliance on the market to co-ordinate the supply and demand for skills works well for societies characterised by the Anglo -Saxon approach to skill formation. However, the market takes time to make adjustments. Therefore this approach may be more suited to societies where the process of industrialisation has been operating over a long period of time. The Tiger economies industrialised in a much shorter period of time. They therefore had to find ways of accelerating the process of skill formation and did this by using the agencies of the state to speed up the operation of the market. In conclusion, we argue that this experience of the Tiger provides a new set of options from which developing societies can draw lessons.

The paper aims to examine the connection between historical narratives constructed by Central Asian states and the phenomenon of regionalism. It analyses how the elites refer to the shared historical legacy of the region and discusses selected historical disputes between states. Theoretical framework is based on the region-building approach. The concept of memory politics is significant for this study. Memory politics might contribute to the integration of society (or societies) and to the creation of collective identity (also regional). The main research method is discourse analysis. The paper focuses on statements of Kazakh and Uzbek presidents. The comparative method is adapted for the juxtaposition of the official historical narratives.

Who are we, Ethiopians? The Origin of the Name Ethiopia Before Rome adopted Christianity as the state religion, before the cathedrals of Europe were erected, Ge'ez was an ancient language that no state could ever write again. Before Latin became the voice of theology, it was the language of the mountains and valleys, the language of Jesus. It was a language carved on stone and leather, whispered in caves and monasteries. It was a language that refused to bow to Caesar. By the 4th century, when Constantine convened the Council of Nicaea, Ge'ez was the sacred language of Ethiopian Christianity. While the Greek and Latin empires translated, corrected, and refined specific phrases to suit their learning and politics, Ethiopian Ge'ez remained unchanged, preserving Jesus untouched by imperial politics. At the time, the entire continent of Africa was called Aethiopia. Aethiopia (Αἰθιοπία) was the ancient Greek term for the vast regions south of Egypt, essentially Sub-Saharan Africa, meaning "Land of the Burnt Faces" and referring to dark-skinned peoples. It encompassed such areas as Nubia (modern Sudan) and Abyssinia (modern Ethiopia), featuring powerful kingdoms such as Kush and Axum, which were known for early adoption of Christianity and for rich cultural exchange. The term evolved from a broad geographical term to denote specific African lands and peoples. We Ethiopians are the Aethiopians; the Greeks referred to the black people of Africa as Aethiopians. Accepting our authentic selves as Black people is essential to selfawareness and true freedom, as it illuminates our desires, strengths, and limitations, freeing us from the bondage of limiting beliefs, societal pressures, and unconscious reactions, thereby allowing us to make conscious, value-aligned choices and live authentically. Without selfknowledge, you're essentially a passenger in your own life, driven by external forces, whereas understanding your inner landscape empowers you. Guiding your own path and acting intentionally encourages personal growth and empowerment. The opposite can happen if the unnecessary amplification of ethnic and cultural differences leads to notable social, economic, and political impacts. The European colonizers and slave traders used such methods to weaken the strength of the local people. They used the slight differences in culture, color, and belief to pave the way for conquest. Exaggerated differences can create disparities in access to resources, opportunities, and services, leading to unequal outcomes among ethnic groups. Systemic biases, individual prejudices, and the historical legacy of discrimination often influence these differences. Understanding these impacts is essential for promoting fair treatment and equal opportunities for all ethnic groups in society.

This working paper addresses the interdisciplinary scientific examination of underdevelopment and stability dynamics. It begins with a general classification of countries' development levels and the role of external structural factors, then conceptually focuses on the case of Iran, employing metaphors from chemistry (stable covalent bonding), physics (dynamic force equilibrium), biology (mutualistic symbiosis versus parasitic relationship), and complex systems theory (self-organization at the edge of chaos). The objective is to offer a neutral framework for understanding the conflict between internal factors and external pressures without taking sides with any party. The findings indicate that unstable equilibrium is frequently the outcome of the mutual reinforcement of these factors. It is proposed that institutions be designed capable of converting external pressures into opportunities for internal synergy.

The most consequential change in the 1960s was the decolonization of Africa. Countries which were the targets of the "scramble for Africa," which were described by Thomas Pakenham (1991) as "the white man's conquest of the dark continent from 1876 to 1912," became independent, one country after another. The continent which by 1902 five European powers-Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Italy-had grabbed almost all of its ten million square miles, awarding themselves thirty new colonies and protectorates, and 110 million bewildered new subjects, was afire with revolutions and revolutionaries, clamoring and fighting for freedom and independence from colonial rule. The continent's struggles were often violent and bloody. A main part of the reason is that these countries became surrogates in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, allies during World War II against Hitler and Nazism, but antagonists in the postwar period over world domination. As it was said then, when two elephants are fighting each other, it is the grass underneath them that is trampled upon and suffers.